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DELEGATION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
THOMAS W. MERRILL*
One of the subthemes in the delegation debate concerns the
importance of judicial review. The Supreme Court has often
upheld broad delegations to administrative actors and in so
doing has pointed out that judicial review is available to safe-
guard citizens from the abuse of unconstrained government
power.' Broad delegations of power to executive actors are
constitutionally permissible, the Court has suggested, in sig-
nificant part because courts stand ready to assure citizens that
the executive will discharge its discretion in a manner consis-
tent with Congress's mandate and in a fashion that otherwise
satisfies the requirements of reasoned decision making.2
Administrative law professors have underscored this point.
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, in his inimitable style, took the
theme to the utmost extreme. He argued that what is really
significant about the nondelegation doctrine is not that Con-
gress must provide an intelligible principle, but that judicial
review is available to make sure that administrative agencies
follow the principle. 3 What matters is that someone, some-
where, supplies a standard for the exercise of administrative
discretion and that the courts can enforce this standard.4 It does
not really matter where the standard comes from. Congress
might supply it, but so too might an agency or even a court.
The important thing is to have some standard to control discre-
tion, plus judicial review.
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. See, e.g., Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944).
2. See, e.g., Am. Power & Light Co., 329 U.S. at 105; Yakus, 321 U.S. at 423, 425.
3. See Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713,
729 (1969); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A
Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1425-26 (2000).
4. See Davis, supra note 3, at 728.
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The Court rejected this particular idea in Whitman v. Ameri-
can Trucking Associations.5 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
dismissed as "internally contradictory" the notion that an
agency could cure a nondelegation problem by adopting a self-
limiting standard. 6 As he explained: "The very choice of which
portion of the power to exercise-that is to say, the prescription
of the standard that Congress had omitted-would itself be an
exercise of the forbidden legislative authority."
7
What has been less noticed about American Trucking is that
the Court, having interred the self-limiting-standards idea, also
omitted the ritual bow to judicial review as an important safe-
guard against abuses of broad delegations. To be sure, the
Court reaffirmed that the question whether a statute violates
the nondelegation doctrine is for the courts to decide.8 And the
Court engaged in vigorous judicial review of the agency deci-
sion that triggered the nondelegation challenge, holding that
the agency's decision was unreasonable. 9 But neither Justice
Scalia nor any of the concurring Justices said that the availabil-
ity of judicial review was itself a relevant element in resolving
the delegation challenge.
Which leads to my topic: What is the role of judicial review
in determining the constitutionality of broad delegations of
power in a world in which the intelligible principle doctrine is,
for practical purposes, dead? To make this question concrete,
let me describe a petition for certiorari recently denied by the
Supreme Court in County of El Paso v. Napolitano.1° The petition
was filed in December 2008 by the Yale Law School Supreme
Court Clinic, of which I am currently a supervisor. The Court
denied certiorari on June 15, 2009," after the conference relisted
the petition seven times.12 As is usual, the Court gave no expla-
nation for the denial.
5. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
6. Id. at 473.
7. Id.
8. Id. ("Whether the statute delegates legislative power is a question for the
courts, and an agency's voluntary self-denial has no bearing upon the answer.").
9. See id. at 486.
10. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, County of El Paso v. Chertoff, 129 S. Ct. 2789
(2009) (No. 08-751), cert. denied sub nom. County of El Paso v. Napolitano, 129 S.
Ct. 2789 (2009).
11. County of El Paso, 129 S. Ct. 2789.
12. Docket Sheet, County of El Paso, 129 S. Ct. 2789 (No. 08-751).
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The petition challenged an amendment to the Illegal Immi-
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA),13 which instructs the Secretary of Homeland Security
to build a barrier fence along portions of the border between
Mexico and the United States to help control illegal entry into
the United States. 14 Congress sought to assure that the fence was
built as quickly as possible and, in particular, that this multimil-
lion dollar construction project would not become bogged down
in litigation. To achieve this objective, Congress amended
IIRIRA in 2005.15 The amended statute, in Section 102(c), dele-
gates authority to the Secretary of Homeland Security to
"waive all legal requirements such Secretary, in such Secre-
tary's sole discretion, determines necessary to ensure expedi-
tious construction of [the fence]." 16 The statute further provides
that federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear "all
causes or claims arising from any" waiver decision and that the
only cause of action or claim that may be brought is one "alleg-
ing a violation of the Constitution of the United States.1 7 The
only avenue for appellate review from the district court's ruling
on constitutionality is by petition for certiorari to the Supreme
Court. 8 All other claims and appeals are barred. In effect,
IIRIRA now effectively gives the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity very broad discretionary authority to declare the construc-
tion site a no-law zone, based on a finding that the abrogation of
laws is "necessary to ensure expeditious construction."1 9
In April 2008, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Cher-
toff issued orders waiving thirty-seven different federal statutes
that might apply to the construction of roughly seven hundred
miles of fence stretching across four states.20 The waived federal
13. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1103 note (2006)).
14. Id. § 102(b).
15. Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 102, 119 Stat. 302, 306 (2005) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1103 note (2006)).
16. IIRIRA § 102(c)(1).
17. Id. § 102(c)(2)(A).
18. Id. § 102(c)(2)(C).
19. Id. § 102(c)(1).
20. Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, as Amended, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,078 (Apr.
8, 2008) (waiving 36 federal statutes); Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Imnmigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, as
No. 1]
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laws include nearly all federal environmental and land use
laws as well as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).21 Al-
though IIRIRA is not explicit as to whether it confers authority
on the Secretary to preempt state and local laws, Secretary
Chertoff also "waive[d]" all state or other laws "related to" the
waived federal statutes.22 The orders recited that the Secretary
found these waivers "necessary to ensure expeditious construc-
tion" of the fence, but offered no further explanation. 23
Because Section 102(c) does not cut off challenges to the con-
stitutionality of the IIRIRA, an affected party can file an action
in federal district court alleging that the statute authorizing
these waivers violates the nondelegation doctrine. Given
American Trucking and the many other decisions upholding ex-
tremely broad delegations against nondelegation challenges, 24
however, it would be futile to challenge Section 102(c) solely on
this ground. The standard "necessary in order to assure expedi-
tious completion" is just as intelligible as "fair and reasonable,"
"requisite to protect the public health," or any of the other
vague standards that the Court has held not to transgress the
limits of permissible delegation.
Yet Section 102(c) also denies affected persons any opportu-
nity to seek judicial review of the merits of a waiver decision:
The IIRIRA expressly precludes challenges to the waivers on
other than constitutional grounds, and for good measure the
Secretary's order also waives the APA.25 The County of El Paso
petitioners had no way, for example, to challenge the finding
that it was necessary to waive the Eagle Protection Act or the
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act. Nor
could they contest the Secretary's interpretation of IIRIRA as
authorizing the waiver of state and local laws as well as federal
laws. This last feature of the waiver orders might prove espe-
cially vexing because the orders did not spell out which state
Amended, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,077 (Apr. 8, 2008) (waiving 25 statutes, including one
not waived in the other order).
21. Id. at 19,078.
22. Id. at 19,077.
23. Id.; see also IIRIRA § 102(c)(1).
24. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (holding that the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was a constitutional delegation of powers).
25. See IIRIRA § 102(c)(1); see also Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, as
Amended, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,077 (Apr. 8, 2008).
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and local laws they purported to preempt. Consequently, any
future dispute over whether the orders did or did not preempt
particular state laws would evidently be decided unilaterally
by the Secretary, because judicial review of such a nonconstitu-
tional issue would be barred.
The primary issue presented in the County of El Paso petition,
therefore, was whether it is constitutionally permissible to
grant broad discretionary authority to an executive officer and
then cut off all avenues of judicial review that would assure that
the executive has exercised this authority in a lawful manner.
26
In other words, County of El Paso presented the question
whether the availability of judicial review is a necessary condi-
tion of permitting broad delegations to executive agencies.
What is the argument for why judicial review should be re-
quired, even if courts do not enforce the intelligible principle
doctrine with any rigor? There are perfectly good pragmatic
arguments for judicial review, of the kind that Professor Davis
and other traditional administrative law scholars have of-
fered.27 Even if Congress delegates power under the most gos-
samer of standards, such as "necessary" or "fair" or "just and
reasonable," judicial review is still useful as a check on execu-
tive discretion. Judicial review requires the agency to give
some reason related to the standard Congress has supplied, to
act consistently or explain its departure from past courses of
conduct in applying the standard, and to respond to plausible
objections grounded in the factual or legal assumptions that
support its action.
It is hard to see, however, how these salutary checks on ex-
ecutive discretion are constitutionally compelled. IIRIRA is not
unconstitutional because judicial review is a good idea. It is
constitutionally suspect only if the denial of judicial review vio-
lates principles of separation of powers. To make the case that
separation of powers requires judicial review, it is necessary to
advance a different claim about the constitutionality of delega-
tion in a post-nondelegation world.
The best argument is this: Just because Congress may delegate,
it does not follow that agencies (or courts for that matter) may
act without a delegation. The Constitution, in other words, incor-
26. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 10, at i.
27. See sources cited supra note 3.
No. 11
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porates a principle that Congress has the exclusive power to
delegate authority to act with the force of law, even if the Consti-
tution does not impose any enforceable limits on the degree of
discretion agencies may exercise once there has been a delega-
tion.28 To put it another way, the executive has no inherent
power to act, at least in the domestic sphere. This principle finds
support in the famous Steel Seizure case29 and, more recently, in
the general repudiation of the Bush Administration's claims to
inherent authority to detain and try enemy combatants 30 and to
monitor electronic communications between U.S. citizens and
foreign parties without congressional authorization.
31
Assume the Constitution does reflect such an anti-inherency
principle. It would then be unconstitutional for an agency to
act with the force of law when Congress has not conferred au-
thority on it to do so. Ultra vires action by executive agencies,
on this view, would be not only unlawful, but also unconstitu-
tional. The agency would be asserting for itself an authority
that only Congress can confer. Citizens faced with executive
action that exceeds the bounds of any delegation of power, it
would follow, have a constitutional right to some form of judi-
cial review that protects them against such an unsanctioned
assertion of governmental power. Judicial review of executive
action, at least to assure such action is not ultra vires, would be
compelled by the Constitution.32
28. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Ex-
clusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097 (2004) (elaborating on this argument).
29. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579,587 (1952).
30. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (concluding that military com-
missions established by the executive to try detainees apprehended in Afghani-
stan were not authorized by appropriate congressional legislation).
31. See ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Admin, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 776-79 (E.D. Mich. 2006),
vacated, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding the Administration's program of
warrantless wiretaps established without congressional authorization violates
separation of powers). For a balanced assessment concluding that the Bush Ad-
ministration went too far in its claims of inherent authority, see STEVEN G.
CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 410-12 (2008).
32. An alternative argument in support of a constitutional right of judicial re-
view might be that conferring unreviewable discretion on an executive actor to
apply federal law in resolving particular cases or controversies violates Article
III, which confers the "judicial power of the United States" on Article III courts.
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Arti-
cle II, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988). This argument, which was not raised in
[Vol. 33
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There are a number of difficult problems with this ultra vires-
means-unconstitutional thesis that would have to be overcome
before it could prevail. I will highlight four.
First, the Supreme Court has rejected the thesis. The rejec-
tion occurred in Dalton v. Specter, a 5-4 decision holding that
judicial review is not available to challenge a decision to close
military facilities under the Defense Base Closure and Re-
alignment Act of 1990. 33 The Court noted that the final deci-
sion to close a base lay with the President, and the President
was not subject to judicial review under the APA.34 The Third
Circuit had held that review was available under the Consti-
tution because the President allegedly was acting in excess of
his statutory authority and, "whenever the President acts in
excess of his statutory authority, he also violates the constitu-
tional separation-of-powers doctrine." 35 In other words, ultra
vires means unconstitutional. The Court rejected this thesis,
finding that "[o]ur cases do not support the proposition that
every action by the President, or by another executive official,
in excess of his statutory authority is ipso facto in violation of
the Constitution.
'36
Dalton seems to foreclose the argument that there is a consti-
tutional right of judicial review to challenge final action taken
by the President without statutory authority. But the Court's
assertion that the same conclusion follows for action taken "by
another executive official" appears to be dictum. The key
precedent relied upon by the Court, Chicago & Southern Air
Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,37 focused on the need to pre-
serve presidential discretion in matters involving foreign af-
fairs. The Court's reliance on Waterman suggests that there may
be affirmative reasons to disclaim an inherent constitutional
right to review presidential action, certainly in matters impli-
cating military and foreign affairs, which would not extend to
decisions taken by subordinate executive officers. Dalton is also
difficult to square with the Steel Seizure case. The Court sought
County of El Paso, would encounter many of the same objections as the separation
of powers argument, as discussed below.
33. 511 U.S. 462, 468-70 (1994).
34. Id. at 469-71.
35. Id. at 471 (citing Specter v. Garrett, 995 F.2d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 1993)).
36. Id. at 472.
37. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
No. 11
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to distinguish Steel Seizure on the ground that the order to na-
tionalize the steel mills was based on a claim of inherent execu-
tive power, not delegated statutory authority.3s But the admini-
stration's lawyers in Steel Seizure argued vigorously that the
seizure of the steel mills was authorized by statute,39 and the
Court closely reviewed and rejected this claim before conclud-
ing the government was acting without statutory authority.40
Steel Seizure therefore reinforces the understanding that judicial
review is vital, certainly as to subordinate executive actors, in
identifying executive action that is ultra vires.
The second problem is that Congress is not required to pro-
vide for judicial review of executive action. The Constitution
does not require Congress to create lower federal courts. 41 If
Congress does create them, the Constitution does not require
that Congress give such courts jurisdiction to hear particular
types of claims, such as challenges to executive action.42 If Con-
gress does create such courts and does permit them to hear
challenges to executive action, the Constitution does not pre-
vent Congress from limiting such claims to facial challenges
brought within a short time after the executive acts, in effect
precluding after-the-fact judicial review of executive action al-
leged to be ultra vires.43
One reason Congress is assumed to have this degree of dis-
cretion is that state courts may be available to hear claims that
the executive is acting in an ultra vires fashion.44 If Congress
refuses to create a federal court remedy, aggrieved parties can
challenge lawless executive action in state court. Historically,
for example, citizens could sue federal officers in state court in
tort, although recent immunity doctrines appear to eliminate
this option.45 Whatever might happen in other contexts, IIRIRA
38. Dalton, 511 U.S. at 473.
39. See, e.g., 343 U.S. 579, 670-71, 697-98, 702, 704 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 585-87 (majority opinion).
41. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
42. See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 441 (1850).
43. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
44. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1363-64, 1401-02 (1953).
45. See Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation (Westfall)
Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2006) (eliminating personal tort liability for federal
employees acting within the scope of their employment).
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eliminates this safety valve. IIRIRA confers exclusive jurisdic-
tion on federal courts over any claim arising out of a waiver
decision.46 State court review is thus precluded by statute, as is
federal court review on all but constitutional claims. If this
provision is within the constitutional authority of Congress,
then Congress can deny both federal and state court review,
necessarily raising the question whether there is a constitu-
tional right of review at all.
Another possible way to challenge lawless executive action
where Congress has precluded review is through simple defi-
ance. Those who think the executive is acting unlawfully can
force the government to arrest them, or to bring suit against
them, and can raise the ultra vires claim in defense against
such action. This tactic might work in some contexts where
judicial review has been denied as a matter of statute. If the
Secretary had waived the federal statute conferring jurisdic-
tion on the Court of Federal Claims to hear takings claims
47
(which he did not, although there would appear to be nothing
in IIRIRA to preclude him from doing so), and the Secretary
then seized someone's home because it was in the path of the
fence, the owner could chain himself in his home and chal-
lenge the necessity of the waiver in his trial for obstructing the
construction effort.
Nevertheless, it is hard to see how similar acts of civil dis-
obedience would give rise to opportunities to challenge waiv-
ers of the Eagle Protection Act or the National Parks Organic
Act. Protestors who chain themselves to the gates of nuclear
power plants cannot raise the plants' health risks to the public
as a defense to their prosecution for trespass. 4 Similarly, it is
unlikely that those who chain themselves across the path of the
fence would be allowed to raise the peril to bald eagles or na-
tional parkland as a defense to their conviction. So IIRIRA sug-
gests that there will not always be a right of review if the Con-
stitution does not create such a right.
The third problem is Congress's long recognized power to
make certain kinds of executive action unreviewable. This
46. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 102(c)(2)(A), 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codi-
fied as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note (2006)).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a)(1) (2006) (conferring jurisdiction "to render judgment
upon any claim against the United States founded... upon the Constitution").
48. State v. Warshow, 410 A.2d 1000, 1002 (Vt. 1979).
No. 1]
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principle is enshrined in the APA.49 The paradigm case of un-
reviewability, according to the Supreme Court, is when there is
no law to apply. 0 Note the tension between the classic non-
delegation claim and this unreviewability doctrine. The non-
delegation doctrine says that Congress must supply an intelli-
gible principle to guide executive action, in part to provide a
basis for meaningful judicial review; the unreviewability doc-
trine says that if Congress supplies no principle at all the action
is unreviewable. Recall that IIRIRA allows the Secretary to
waive any law "in [his] sole discretion."5 Why is this not an
express preclusion of review or, at the least, an implied preclu-
sion based on the commitment of the waiver decision to the
Secretary's discretion?
52
The answer to this objection may be that our constitutional
form of government gives private rights a privileged status
relative to public rights.5 3 The classic nondelegation doctrine is
implicitly limited to cases in which broad discretionary au-
thority threatens private rights of liberty and property.
Prominent nondelegation cases involve importers faced with
higher tariffs, 4 manufacturing firms faced with price controls,
5
criminal defendants faced with longer deprivations of their lib-
erty, 6 and so forth. The nondelegation doctrine could more ac-
curately be formulated as saying that Congress must supply
an intelligible principle to constrain the discretion of the ex-
ecutive insofar as it seeks to interfere with private rights. The un-
reviewability doctrine, in contrast, is usually encountered
when Congress has given broad discretionary authority to the
executive in disposing of matters involving public rights. Ex-
49. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2006) (precluding ju-
dicial review if statutes preclude review or if agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law).
50. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
51. IIRIRA § 102(c)(1).
52. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (holding unreviewable under the
APA a decision by the Director of the CIA, "in his discretion," to terminate any
employee).
53. See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989). See generally
Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
14-20 (1983) (discussing the tradition of heightened judicial review where the
government impinges on private rights).
54. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
55. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
56. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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amples of this broad discretionary authority include determin-
ing how to spend the taxpayers' money 57 and whether to bring
enforcement actions.
5 8
This private right versus public right distinction undoubt-
edly carries over to challenges based on claims of ultra vires
government action. If there is a constitutional right to judicial
review when the government is acting outside the scope of its
delegated authority, the clearest case would be where the gov-
ernment is interfering with private rights. One could argue the
executive also acts unconstitutionally when it exceeds the
scope of its delegated authority in a manner that affects public
rights. This action would be ultra vires as well and hence, by
hypothesis, unconstitutional. But such a constitutional viola-
tion might well be one that Congress, in its judgment, can
make unreviewable.
The County of El Paso petition asserted that the Secretary's
waiver decisions affected private rights and not merely public
rights.59 The petition noted, for example, that the waivers
might override established water rights or might interfere
with access to Indian burial grounds.60 Whether these interests
qualify as private rights is unclear. The Court has never set-
tled on a definition of private rights.61 The district court, in de-
nying a preliminary injunction, found that there was little evi-
dence that the construction of the fence would irreparably
harm any of these interests. So even if water rights and access
to burial grounds are private rights, they might not have been
impaired to a sufficient degree to establish standing to claim a
constitutional right of review to protect private rights.62 Other
57. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993) (holding agency allocation of lump sum
appropriation unreviewable).
58. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (holding decision not to bring en-
forcement action presumptively unreviewable).
59. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 10, at 19.
60. Id. at 21.
61. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982)
("The distinction between public rights and private rights has not been defini-
tively explained in our precedents. Nor is it necessary to do so in the present
cases .. "). See generally Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 559, 565-93 (2007) (discussing the complexities in the nineteenth
century conception of private rights).
62. The government, in its opposition, advanced a standing objection to the
claims advanced by the petitioners in County of El Paso, even though this had not
No. 1]
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affected interests, like saving bald eagles or preserving recrea-
tional access to the Rio Grande, are obviously even more prob-
lematic grounds on which to assert a constitutional right to ju-
dicial review because these interests are more naturally
classified as public rights.
The fourth problem is that this argument may threaten to
constitutionalize all of administrative law. The problem is gen-
erated by the nagging thought that practically any violation of
administrative law can be characterized as ultra vires action.
Take the most humdrum type of claim: that an agency decision
is not supported by "substantial evidence." A clever lawyer
could reason as follows: The statute establishing the agency
requires that its decisions must be supported by substantial
evidence; therefore Congress has delegated authority to the
agency only to make decisions backed by substantial evidence;
this decision is not supported by substantial evidence; thus the
agency had no authority to make the decision; therefore it is
ultra vires; therefore I have a constitutional right to judicial re-
view to advance my substantial evidence claim. This potential
collapse of the distinction between constitutional and statutory
review seems to have been a motivating factor in the Court's
decision in Dalton v. Specter.63
I am not sure that there is a knock-down answer to this prob-
lem. Part of the answer may be an appeal to common sense.
There is an intuitive distinction between claims that an agency
is acting outside its jurisdiction and claims that an agency
made a mistake. Most people, most of the time, can readily
agree about the category in which a particular claim falls. There
will be borderline cases, but there are always borderline cases,
whether the distinction is between tall and short or fat and
thin. Yet the difficulty of line drawing does not compel us to
give up on these distinctions in despair. One can trust courts
been raised in the district court. See Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 8-
14, County of El Paso v. Napolitano, No. 08-751 (U.S. Mar. 13, 2009).
63. See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 474 (1994). In Dalton, the Court reaf-
firmed its decision in Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992), which held that
actions taken by the President can be reviewed for constitutional violations, even
though they cannot be reviewed under the APA. Dalton observed: "[Ihf every
claim alleging that the President exceeded his statutory authority were considered
a constitutional claim, the exception identified in Franklin would be broadened
beyond recognition." 511 U.S. at 474.
[Vol. 33
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not to grant a constitutional right of review to oversee rela-
tively inconsequential claims.
Another part of the answer may be that it will be a rare case
that requires constitutionalizing judicial review, because ordi-
nary, garden-variety administrative law will nearly always
provide a constitutionally adequate substitute. APA-style judi-
cial review, in the form applied by federal courts today, is un-
doubtedly a constitutionally adequate form of review to assure
that agencies stay within the bounds of their delegated discre-
tion. So the constitutional question will be avoided, in ninety-
nine percent of the cases, by applying ordinary statutory re-
view principles. The constitutional review requirement would
lurk in the background and would be called upon only in the
rare case like County of El Paso where Congress has tried to
close off review altogether and has left the executive to be the
judge of its own cause in a matter that arguably affects private
rights. Even if the anti-inherency argument could constitution-
alize much of administrative law in theory, the danger is
minimal in practice.
In the end, it is likely that the cumulative weight of the prob-
lems with recognizing a constitutional right of review proved
too much for the Court to take on. IIRIRA was an extreme
measure, suggesting the potential need for such a doctrine. But
the border fence is nearing completion under the oversight of a
new administration that (for now) is less given to extravagant
claims of inherent authority than its predecessor. Sometimes
important constitutional questions are best left unresolved
when the urgency of the problem is likely to expire of its own
course. Or so the Court may have concluded in its lengthy de-
liberations about whether to hear County of El Paso.
No. 1]
